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This article traces different devices and practices (i.e., ultrasound scan, fine 
needle aspiration and breast examination) involved in the clinical diagnostic 
practices for breast cancer and suggests that they might be productively 
considered as “visualization apparatuses.” Drawing on auto-ethnographic data 
and medical literature, it explores how these apparatuses make visible and help 
materialize a particular bodily configuration (e.g., a simple cyst as a benign breast 
disorder). In examining side by side the practices and devices commonly 
characterized as medical imaging such as ultrasonography and the more 
mundane apparatuses such as syringes or trained eyes and fingers, the article 
draws attention to the non-given nature of image and imaging, and to the equally 
non-given nature of the distinctions between vision, touch and hearing as modes 
of sensing and knowing. In doing so, it seeks to problematize the traditional 
partitioning of experience into separate and separable perceptual and 
epistemological modalities, while at the same time reclaiming vision, touch and 
hearing as metaphors for responsible and accountable knowledge-making. 
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Bringing together feminist (Haraway, 1988; Puig de la Bellacasa, 2009; Barad, 
2007; 2012) and post-phenomenological (Ihde, 2007; Ingold, 2000) work on 
knowledge-making and perception with the concept of synesthesia (Harris, 2016; 
Hayward, 2010; Marks, 2002), it argues for a certain knowledge politics beyond 
“sense atomism,” which helps us to rethink not only the apparent distinction in 
the different sensorial universes but also, more broadly, the questions of 




 [T]he medical gaze embraces more than is said by the word “gaze” 
 alone. It contains within a single structure different sensorial fields. 
 The sight/touch/hearing trinity defines a perceptual configuration in 
 which the inaccessible illness is tracked down by markers, gauged 
in depth, drawn to the surface, and projected virtually on the dispersed 
 organs of the corpse. The “glance” has become a complex 
 organization with a view to a spatial assignation of the invisible. … 
 The medical gaze is now endowed with a plurisensorial structure. 
A gaze that touches, hears, and, moreover, not by essence or necessity, 
 sees. (Foucault, 2000, p. 164). 
 
The medical gaze, the cornerstone of the sociological imagination of the 
relationship between vision, knowledge and embodiment in the space of 
the clinic (Foucault, 2000), has long been seen as linking the different 
sensoria within one perceptual and epistemological configuration. Michel 
Foucault speaks in this context of the local, “borderline gaze of touch and 
hearing” practiced by physicians (2000, p. 165). Applying his concept to 
the case of a computer tomography suite, medical anthropologist Barry 
F. Saunders notes how “looking comprises a multiplicity of gestures” 
(2010, p. 18). And yet, while other senses might be involved in its 
“plurisensorial structure,” the organizing principle of the gaze and of the 
clinic often appears to be that of a fundamental visibility concerned with 
the spatial arrangements of bodies (Foucault, 2000, pp. 164-165). The 
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practices and apparatuses of medical imaging seemingly contribute to 
this visual regime as they help produce particular reconfigurations of 
objects/bodies in terms of sets of images or image data (Prasad, 2005). 
The materiality of these visual arrangements and the devices and 
practices which help to constitute them has been widely discussed; on 
the one hand, in the tracing of the conditions of development and 
production of particular imaging technologies (Joyce, 2006; Koch, 1993; 
Pasveer, 1989; Yoxen, 1987); and, on the other hand, in the careful 
articulations of the clinical practices in which they are involved (Joyce, 
2005; Prasad, 2005; Saunders, 2010). Contrary to popular imaginaries, 
the visual in the clinic is not virtual; it does not make the patient and her 
embodied experience “disappear behind the images” (Blaxter, 2009, p. 
764). Neither is it representational if we are to follow feminist science 
studies scholar Karen Barad’s understanding of representationalism as a 
metaphysical framework separating the world into “the ontologically 
disjoint domains of words and things” (2003, p. 811) or “representations” 
and “ontologically separate entities awaiting representation” (2007, p. 49). 
As she notes in her discussion of fetal ultrasonography, the apparatus 
“does not allow us to peer innocently at the fetus, nor does it simply offer 
constraints on what we can see; rather it helps produce and is part of the 
body it images” (2007, p. 202). In this context, the fetus and the 
ultrasound image are not separate entities but rather parts of an 
ontologically inseparable phenomenon constituted in the intra-action of 
the “object” and the “agencies of observation.”1 
Following Barad’s understanding of apparatuses as “instrument[s] 
of power through which particular meanings and bodies and material-
discursive boundaries are produced” (2001, p. 80),2 in this article I want to 
trace different devices and practices (i.e., ultrasound scan, fine needle 
aspiration as well as breast examination and self-examination) involved in 
the clinical diagnostic practices for breast cancer and to suggest that 
they might be productively considered as “visualization apparatuses.” I 
use this term to refer to these instruments, technologies and practices, 
which have power to render objects/bodies visible, that is, observable 
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and knowable, but – importantly – only as part and parcel of their own 
apparatus. These “visualization apparatuses” and the notion of visibility 
they entail can be seen to encapsulate different optical systems 
(embodied or otherwise), and the possible configurations of images or 
image data. But, crucially, they need to be understood also in relation to 
other perceptual systems and other types of data. 
Drawing on auto-ethnographic work, on oncological and 
radiological literature and on feminist science studies and post-
phenomenological accounts of sensory perception and knowledge, I want 
to explore how the three biomedical apparatuses (i.e., ultrasound scan, 
fine needle aspiration as well as breast examination and self-examination) 
make visible and help materialize a particular bodily configuration of 
which (importantly) they are part: a simple cyst, a benign breast disorder. 
By examining side by side the practices and devices commonly 
characterized as medical imaging, such as ultrasonography, and the 
more mundane apparatuses, such as syringes or trained eyes and 
fingers, I want to open up for inquiry two important issues related to 
visualization and its apparatuses. 
Firstly, I want to draw attention to and problematize the notion of 
medical imaging technologies as given and predefined objects or entities. 
The non-givenness of imaging technologies needs to be understood not 
only by recognizing that, as “apparatuses of observation” in the sense 
suggested by Barad (2003, p. 815), these technologies are not separable 
from their objects of investigation but rather intra-actively materialized 
together with these objects. The non-givenness of these technologies 
needs also to be understood in terms of acknowledging that, as the 
objects of inquiry, they are not separable from the specific practices, in 
which they are located, including our analytical practices. Imaging has 
sometimes been defined as relating to specific technologies and 
practices involved in the configuration of images (see, for example, 
Papenburg et al., 2015). In this article I want to explore the broader 
genealogies of three different medical apparatuses, and investigate how 
some of them (i.e., the ultrasound and its digital display) come to be 
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included in the biomedical imaginary of imaging, while the other (i.e., 
needles and syringes in fine needle aspiration, or eyes and fingers in 
medical examination) come to be excluded. In the process, I also want to 
explore what specific modes of sensing and knowing are involved in 
making these differentiations. 
This last question brings forth the second and central concern of 
the article. By bringing together these diverse practices and apparatuses, 
I want to explore and problematize the relationship between vision, touch 
and hearing as modes of sensing and knowing in biomedicine. In various 
diagnostic practices for breast cancer, seeing might be understood as 
always already dependent on different forms of hearing and touching 
with/in different bodies, both human and non-human (as sonic waves are 
transduced into electronic ultrasound images; or as the suction of a 
syringe in fine needle aspiration draws out and makes visible bodily 
fluids); touch might also be a “listening-touch” (Harris, 2016) (as 
piezoelectric crystals of an ultrasound transducer vibrate in response to 
electric currents and ultrasonic waves), and both can be understood as 
visualizing devices, or “haptic-optic” systems (Hayward, 2010, pp. 580-
581), which help render particular bodies and particular bodily conditions 
(such as a simple fluid-filled breast cyst) visible and intelligible. This 
insistence on the problematic distinctions between vision and touch, 
touch and hearing, and vision and hearing is not meant to suggest that 
biomedical practices and apparatuses are simply multisensory, nor that 
the different sensoria are indistinguishable as modes of perception. 
Rather it suggests that vision, touch and hearing, as modes of sensing 
and knowing, cannot be taken for granted, as already given, distinct from 
one another, and from the phenomena, which they render knowable, but 
are more appropriately understood as such in particular instances of 
seeing/touching/hearing/knowing and in relation to specific practices and 
apparatuses. 
In this article I therefore seek to problematize the traditional 
partitioning of experience into separate and separable perceptual and 
epistemological modalities while at the same time reclaiming vision, touch 
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and hearing as metaphors for responsible and accountable knowledge-
making. Drawing on the feminist tradition of situated knowledges 
(Haraway, 1988) and response-ability (Barad, 2007; 2012) and on non-
atomist (Ihde, 2007; Ingold, 2000) or synesthetic understandings of sense 
and experience (Harris, 2016; Hayward, 2010; Marks, 2002), I want to 
argue for a relational understanding of sensory experience and the related 
conception of knowledge politics beyond “sense atomism.”3 Bringing 
together the feminist and post-phenomenological work on knowledge-
making and perception with the concepts of synesthesia, I suggest, can 
help us to rethink not only the apparent distinction in the different 
sensorial universes but also, more broadly, the questions of knowledge, 
politics, responsibility and accountability. 
 
Knowledge Politics of Vision, Touch and Hearing 
 
As noted by Maria Puig de la Bellacasa, feminist theorist of science and 
technology, vision has been “the dominant metaphor in modern 
knowledge-making and epistemologies” (2009, p. 298) and, as such, 
subject to much feminist critique. The key point for this critique has been 
the traditional linking of vision with a particular version of objectivity, what 
Donna Haraway (1988) calls the “god trick” (pp. 581-582), an 
epistemological orientation marked by the disengaged view “from 
everywhere and nowhere” and by the absolute separation of the viewing 
subject from the object of its conquering gaze. The reclaiming of vision 
both as a metaphor and as a specific field of sensory experience is the 
fulcrum of Haraway’s argument for situated knowledges (1988). Wrested 
away from the illusions of disembodiment and transparency, vision can 
no longer be conceptualized as single or totalizing but rather as 
splintered into partial perspectives which are always finite and locatable 
and never innocent: “Vision is always a question of the power to see – 
and perhaps of the violence implicit in our visualizing practices. With 
whose blood were my eyes crafted?” (pp. 585, emphasis in original). The 
embodied and located vision of situated knowledge does not remove or 
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negate this violence; instead, it allows us to become accountable for it, 
“answerable for what we learn how to see” (p. 583). This vision is best 
characterized by the optics of diffraction rather than that of reflection, 
concerned as it is with “the production of difference patterns in the world, 
not just of the same reflected – displaced – elsewhere” (Haraway, 1997, 
p.  268). 
Following Haraway’s project of re-appropriating vision for feminist 
knowledge politics, Puig de la Bellacasa (2009) turns to touch as the 
foundation of situated and committed knowledges. Tracing the move 
from vision to what she calls “touching visions” in feminist theorizing, she 
explores the potential of touch in problematizing “abstractions and 
disengagements of (epistemological) distances – between subjects and 
objects, knowledge and the world, affects and facts, politics and science” 
(p. 298). In this context, touch appears to be linked with the fuller 
recognition of the matters of embodiment, relationality and engagement. 
The reversibility of touching contact, the possibility of “being-in-touch-
with” oneself and another, of being materially involved with/in the tangible 
world in its ongoing transformations – these seem to be the promises of 
touch as a sensorial universe and as a metaphor for knowledge-making. 
But, as Puig de la Bellacasa suggests, turning to touch does not mean 
replacing the illusions of distance and transparency with those of the 
embodied, unmediated immediacy. Situated knowledges reclaiming 
touch, just as those re-appropriating vision, are not immune to injustice or 
violence; they give no assurances of final resolution, rather they open up 
spaces for accountability. As Barad notes: “Touch is never pure or 
innocent. It is inseparable from the field of differential relations that 
constitute it” (2012, p. 215). Touching involves a response to the other, 
where the other and the self are not already given but constituted in 
mutual “response-ability.” Touch is thus a matter of responsibility 
understood not as an obligation of the self toward the other but as a 
relation integral to the ongoing worldly materializations within which the 
self and the other are articulated and materialized (Barad, 2007, p. 265). It 
is the responsibility for these articulations and materializations, for the 
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material consequences of our world-shaping (touching) visions, that 
marks feminist knowledge politics.4  
The feminist projects of reclaiming vision and touch have been 
paralleled by the anthropological and post-phenomenological work 
revaluing the significance of hearing as a mode of sensing and making 
sense of the world (Ingold, 2000; Ihde, 2007; Rice, 2008). The “auditory 
turn” (Ihde, 2007) has looked to sound and hearing as a way for a more 
participatory and relational engagement between subjects and objects: 
listening to the voice of the other, giving voice, being immersed in a 
shared stream of sound, traversing the boundaries of inside/outside. As 
touch before, hearing seems to suggest the possibility of redressing the 
distancing and objectifying orderings of vision: “[T]here is an old and 
deeply held tradition that vision ‘objectifies’, and, contrarily but not so 
widely noted, there is also a tradition which holds that sound 
‘personifies’” (Ihde, 2007, p. 21). And yet, for Don Ihde and Tim Ingold, 
this turn to sound and hearing is not meant to idealize the auditory 
experience but rather to draw attention to the problematic 
understandings of experience, perception and knowledge as implied by 
the dominant visualist tradition. This tradition, according to Ihde, 
introduces a certain “sense atomism” (2007, p. 46), which, firstly, 
conceptualizes experience in terms of distinct and separable sensory 
systems and, secondly, enacts a radical break between sense and 
significance, between perception and cognition. As Ingold explains: 
At the heart of this approach is a representationalist theory of 
knowledge, according to which people draw on the raw material of 
bodily sensation to build up an internal picture of what the world 
“out there” is like, on the basis of models or schemata received 
through their education in a particular tradition. The theory rests on 
a fundamental distinction between physical and cultural 
dimensions of perception, the former having to do with the 
registration of sensation by the body and brain, the latter with the 
construction of representations in the mind. (Ingold, 2000, pp.  
282-283)5  
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He further argues that it is only through this “narrow conception of 
thought” (p. 287) that vision had come to be seen as an objectifying 
sense and thus opposed to the seemingly more participatory mode of 
hearing. Drawing attention to sound and hearing opens up a possibility 
for intervening into this limited understanding of vision and knowledge. 
The “auditory turn” thus constitutes not only the reclaiming of sound and 
hearing, but also the reclaiming of vision as a field of sensory experience, 
and as a metaphor for thought.  
 
Knowledge Politics beyond “Sense Atomism” 
 
Crucial for Ihde’s (2007) and Ingold’s (2000) understanding of knowledge 
and perception is the resistance to “sense atomism” or the partitioning of 
experience into separate and separable modes of sensing.6 Drawing on 
phenomenological understandings of experience, these authors suggest 
that in the actual sensory and perceptual practices seeing, touching and 
hearing are not distinct activities but intermingled aspects of the bodily 
engagement with/in the world. This problematic separation of the 
different modes of sensing has often been illustrated by the phenomenon 
of synesthesia, that is, the capacity to perceive a sensation related to a 
particular sensory modality in response to a stimulation of another (e.g., 
seeing certain forms or colors on hearing particular sounds). As Ingold 
(2000, p. 268) notes, the very category of synesthesia relies on and 
further reproduces “a two-fold distinction between sensation and 
perception on the one hand, and between discrete sensory modalities on 
the other.” But, as illustrated by such synesthetic concepts as “haptic 
visuality” (Marks, 2002), “fingeryeyes” (Hayward, 2010) and “listening-
touch” (Harris, 2016), the notion of synesthesia nevertheless introduces 
the possibility of disrupting these distinctions, and in doing so, 
contributes to a non-atomist, non-representationalist, response-able 
politics of knowledge. 
Media theorist Laura Marks uses the concept of “haptic visuality” 
to trouble the separation between vision and touch. On her account, 
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haptic perception, “the way we experience touch both on the surface of 
and inside our bodies” (2002, p. 2), forms part of the visual experience of 
cinema. This entails a certain embodied and tactile vision where the eyes 
act as organs of touch, feeling as well as seeing the textures of the 
cinematic image. Haptic visuality is thus constituted through particular 
forms of images, “haptic images,” but also, and more importantly, in the 
reconfiguring of the relationship between images and their viewers, 
between the objects and subjects of the gaze:  
Haptic images do not invite identification with a figure so much as 
 they encourage a bodily relationship between the viewer and the 
 image. Thus it is less appropriate to speak of the object of a haptic 
 look than to speak of a dynamic subjectivity between looker and 
 image. (p. 3)  
Eschewing identification in favor of an embodied, dynamic relationality, 
haptic visuality thus seems to follow the diffractive optics of situated 
(touching) visions.  
Following Marks’s concern with haptic optics, feminist science 
studies scholar Eva Hayward proposes a notion of “fingeryeyes” as a way 
of attending to the “synaesthetic quality of materialized sensation” (2010, 
p.  580). But, her concern is not as much with the relationship between 
the viewer and the image as with the possibilities of sensing across 
different sensoria, different media and, most importantly, different 
species. Looking at the laboratory encounters of marine biologists and 
their critters, Hayward suggests that vision and touch are not separate or 
separable but remain in the relationship of “constitutive supplementarity,” 
which is expressed in and generates particular textures of the world (p. 
582). In this understanding of sense and sensory experience, the eyes 
and the fingers and, equally, the tentacles, are not seen as distinct organs 
of perception but rather as inseparable from (within) the body’s 
sensorium. Vision and touch are amalgamated and slide into each other 
as fingers and eyes and tentacles converge in moments of sensitization. 
Importantly, in these instances of sensing, species do not simply react to 
one another and to their environment, rather they manifest “with and of” 
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the environment and the other, thus constituting “a sensorial ensemble” 
(p. 593). The notion of “fingeryeyes” thus troubles the sensory, bodily and 
species boundaries while also hinting at the power relations inherent in 
the embodied haptic optics:  
Cross-species sensations are always mediated by power that 
leaves impressions, which leaves bodies imprinted and furrowed 
with consequences. Animal bodies – the coral’s and mine – carry 
forms of domination, communion, and activation into the folds of 
being. (p. 592)  
As such, it calls forth and makes space for response-ability in sensing 
and knowledge-making. 
Coming from the field of medical anthropology, Anna Harris’s 
concept of “listening touch” offers parallel insights into the distributed 
nature of sensation and the permeability of bodily boundaries (2016). 
Exploring the ways in which medical students are taught and acquire the 
skills necessary for the clinical technique of percussion, she suggests 
that listening and touch are not confined to and experienced through their 
respective organs of the ears and the fingers, rather they constitute a 
form of “body-listening touch” (p. 42). As the training physicians pay 
attention to the pitch as well as the vibration of the percussed bodies, the 
auditory and tactile experiences become intertwined within the 
movements of the sensing body: “Listening-touch in percussion is not a 
single moment. As the finger-hand-wrist moves, the ear anticipates. The 
body works in coordination and listening-touch is distributed throughout 
the technique” (pp. 37-38). Interestingly, for Harris the concept of 
“listening-touch” problematizes not only the distinction between touch 
and hearing. Similarly to haptic optics and its diffractive touching visions, 
it also helps to trouble the separation between the subjects and objects 
of perception, as (in the case of self-percussion, an important technique 
for clinical training) the percussing bodies also become the resonating 
ones. 
The synesthetic notions of “haptic visuality,” “fingeryeyes” and 
“listening-touch” contribute to a conception of knowledge politics beyond 
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“sense atomism” as they challenge the representationalist and 
individualist – in the sense suggested by Barad (2003, 2007), Ingold 
(2000) or Ihde (2007) – metaphysical approaches which separate subjects 
and objects of perception and divide sensation into distinct domains of 
different senses and their respective organs. These concepts do not 
simply imply that perception is multisensory or multimodal; they also 
indicate the inherent intra-activity of sensory practices which are also, 
importantly, knowledge practices. Writing about the “robotic tactility” 
feminist science studies scholar Claudia Castañeda (2001) suggests that 
touch cannot be understood in any general abstract terms as a given. 
Rather it needs to be seen as constituted through particular embodied 
relations, particular encounters between bodies and worlds, where 
touching bodies and the nature of their relation are not already 
established “in advance of an encounter” but are materialized through 
them (p. 230). The notions of “haptic visuality,” “fingeryeyes” and 
“listening-touch” extend this understanding of touch into other modes of 
sensing and knowing. In this view, seeing, touching and hearing need to 
be conceptualized – to paraphrase Castañeda’s words – as relational 
qualities that arise out of embodied intra-actions. As I will argue in the 
following parts of the article, this has important consequences for our 
understanding of medical imaging technologies and other diagnostic 
“apparatuses of observation” (Barad, 2003, p. 815) not as already given 
but as intra-actively constituted in particular instances of 
seeing/touching/hearing/knowing, which also importantly help determine 
what comes to be understood as vision, touch and hearing in 
biomedicine. What follows is the discussion of the three different 
“visualization apparatuses” involved in the clinical diagnostic practices for 
breast cancer (ultrasound scan, fine needle aspiration as well as breast 
examination and self-examination). This discussion draws on various 
sources of data, including auto-ethnographic field notes, patient 
information leaflets, radiological and oncological literature, and historical 
and philosophical accounts of different imaging technologies.7 
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Imaging Bodies, Imagining Vision 
 
Dark room, lying on the bed, half turned toward the ultrasound 
screen and the doctor who stands next to it. Cold gel on the breast 
and the sensation of the transducer probe moving over the skin, 
coming back to the same place over and over again. Not looking at 
my breast but at the screen, where more than fifty shades of grey 
are swirling. Among the grey and greyish, the blackish spots move. 
Is it what the doctor is looking for? Yes, this is a cyst, the doctor 
says. Do you want me to drain it off today? 
Again the greyish swirls on the screen, the blackish spots 
among them. A sharp scratch now, says the doctor. The sharp 
stinging sensation in my breast, but still I am not looking there. I 
look at the screen. And, suddenly, a thin long shape in the lighter 
shades of grey moving through the swirls. This is a needle, I think 
to myself. The greyish shape meets with one blacker spot, then 
another, and both of them vanish. Ah, these are the cysts. Then, 
the thin shape disappears from the screen too. Only the grey swirls 
remain. The needle has been taken out. It is now drained, the 
doctor says. Were there one or two cysts? I ask. Two, he confirms. 
Ah yes, I could see it on the screen, I say, proud of being able to 
“read” the scan correctly. So it was only some fluid? Yes, look, it’s 
here, the doctor says and shows me the syringe with a yellowish 
fluid inside. So, these are the cysts too. You can touch your breast 
and see that it’s gone now, the doctor says. Obediently, I touch my 
breast, but I am worried to press too hard in case it hurts. Full of 
tension and apprehension I cannot say whether I sense any 
change. Still, not to disappoint the doctor I say: Oh, yes, it’s gone. 
Thank you! 
This scene in the dimmed clinical room with the ultrasound machine at its 
center is one among several episodes constituting my encounter with 
diagnostic practices for breast cancer. It takes place on an early evening 
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in late January 2016, almost three months after my discovery of a 
suspicious lump in my left breast and an urgent visit to my local GP, 
resulting in a non-urgent referral to the breast clinic at a large teaching 
hospital in Scotland. The setting for this scene is disturbingly familiar, 
even if the circumstances are not: a few years earlier I had spent long 
hours in the rooms and corridors of the same out-patient department, not 
as a patient but as an ethnographer following a group of men diagnosed 
with prostate cancer. This does not prepare me for being the subject of 
the clinic’s gaze, but it makes me aware of its various “apparatuses of 
observation” which help to render particular bodily arrangements 
determinate as cancerous or non-cancerous. 
A brief information leaflet received together with my letter of 
appointment tells me that “the Breast Clinic has been designed to 
provide a diagnostic service” for my “breast complaint,” that “certain 
procedures may have to be performed” in different rooms within the 
clinic, that I may “need to spend three to four hours at the clinic before a 
final result is available,” and that during this time I will be seen by “the 
doctor” while nursing staff – including a breast-care nurse specialist – will 
also be present. The leaflet suggests the breast clinic is a complex 
matter: an arrangement of different practices, apparatuses and relations 
involving different human and non-human participants, including clinical 
staff, spaces and technologies. What it does not reveal is the extent of 
the world-making capacity of these practices and apparatuses. Over the 
course of just a few hours the breast clinic helps to make visible and 
materialize a particular bodily configuration: a simple, fluid-filled cyst in 
my left breast now successfully drained and therefore conclusively 
determined as a benign rather than malignant lesion. 
Leafing through oncological and radiological literature, I learn that 
the majority of breast lesions are in fact benign (Guray & Sahin, 2006); 
simple cysts are by far the most common among them (Berg, Sechtin, 
Marques, & Zhang, 2010). As one oncology article notes: “Cysts occur 
predominantly in the middle and late reproductive period, increasing in 
frequency from 35 years to a maximal incidence between 40 and 50 
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years” (Courtillot et al., 2005, p. 329). I have only recently reached the 
lower limit of this age range, but I am already in the company of nearly 
one-in-three women between the age of 35 and 50 who present with a 
cyst. I am also in a more select group of 20% to 25% of cases of simple 
cysts which involve “palpable (gross) cystic change” (Guray & Sahin, 
2006, p. 438). 
The exact causes of cysts like mine are not known, but there might 
be some links with the hormonal changes during the menstrual cycle and 
the excess of estrogen in the body. I learn this from a brief conversation 
with the doctor at the clinic and from a leaflet he has given to me. But 
cysts have also been characterized as disorders of lobular involution thus 
making them part of the “normal” processes by which the breast 
epithelial tissue is gradually lost due to aging. The formation of cysts is 
here seen as a result of the excessive secretion of the epithelium and the 
subsequent dilation of a terminal ductal lobular unit, the basic functional 
unit of the breast (Courtillot et al., 2005). The two cysts in my left breast 
might have formed in this way although – as I learn from another 
oncology source – the pathogenesis of cyst development is still poorly 
understood (Vargas et al., 2004). But the way in which cysts materialize 
and become visible in the breast clinic in the form of fluid-filled structures 
relies on a number of “visualization apparatuses.” The ultrasound 
machine and its particular ways of seeing and making visible is one of 
these apparatuses.  
As I read in a medical textbook on breast imaging:  
The most common sonolucent mass in the breast is the simple 
cyst. To make an accurate diagnosis of a benign cyst, strict criteria 
should be observed. Cysts should have sharply defined walls. 
They may be round, ovoid, or lobulated and appear solitary or in 
groups. Cysts should have no internal echoes. (Kopans, 2007, p. 
585) 
“Sonolucent” is a term used in ultrasonography to describe that which 
allows a through-transmission of ultrasonic waves without reflecting them 
back to their source, that is, without producing any echoes. In practice, 
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and very much against its etymology (Latin sonus “sound” and lucere “to 
shine”), this term is used to characterize these areas of the ultrasound 
image that appear black and non-reflective, rather than bright with the 
reflected sound waves. These are the (silent) black spots among the 
(echoing) grey swirls. 
The complex genealogies of ultrasonography have been widely 
acknowledged: from its roots in the developments of military sonar and 
radar technologies through its early applications in medicine, where it 
focused on therapeutic rather than diagnostic uses, to its particular 
implications for female bodies and subjectivities both in the testing of its 
early apparatuses on breast cancer patients and in its ongoing, pervasive 
use in obstetrics (Cartwright, 1992; Duden, 1993; Koch, 1993; Mitchell, 
2001).  
What has also been noted is the particular, non-optical nature of 
its vision (Barad, 1998; 2007). Ultrasound imaging does not rely on the 
properties and behavior of light; its seeing and making visible is instead 
dependent on the emission, reflection and absorption of the high 
frequency sound waves transmitted to a body through the direct contact 
with a transducer, converted into electric currents, calculated by a 
computer and, finally, displayed in a visual form as a two- (or three- or 
four-) dimensional image. This – in the words of sociologist of science 
Edward Yoxen (1987) – is “seeing with sound” (p. 281). But, equally, it 
could be considered a form of “listening-touch”: as the ultrasound 
transducer slides over a gel-covered body, its piezoelectric crystals 
vibrate in response to the electric currents and to the ultrasonic waves 
which pass through and are diffracted by the tissues. This way of imaging 
through sound and touch, which displays sonographic data in terms of 
spatial relations between differently echoing tissues, owes much to 
medicine’s earlier visual traditions, such as X-ray imaging (Koch, 1993) 
and anatomical drawings of the cross-sections of different body parts 
(Yoxen, 1987). But, as the history of ultrasonography suggests, this way 
of imaging was not the only one possible or even considered. The early 
ultrasonic devices developed by John Wild and tested on women with 
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different breast lesions presented sonographic data in reference to their 
different acoustic behaviors as plotted on a diagram (Koch, 1993) and, as 
such, did not contribute as easily to the imaginary of a body opened up 
for visual inspection. 
For, as Barad (2007) has importantly noted, the ultrasound does 
not simply allow us to peer at or into the body; rather “the marks on the 
computer screen (the sonogram images, sonic diffraction patterns 
translated into an electronic image) refer to a phenomenon that is 
constituted in the intra-action of the ‘object’ … and the ‘agencies of 
observation’” (p. 202). The ultrasound makes the cyst visible but only as a 
part of its own apparatus, as a sonolucent spot, visualized through 
electric transformations of sound waves into a digital image. Deferred 
from the sonic diffraction patterns, the cyst can only be seen and known 
diffractively through its variously materialized effects. What is also 
materialized and constituted in this process of transduction and 
translation of sonic data into a particular configuration of image data is 
the notion of ultrasonography as an imaging technology and a form of 
seeing rather than touching or hearing. The same cannot be said of some 
other apparatuses within the breast clinic, such as fine needle aspiration 
and breast examination, which contribute to the materialization of the 
fluid-filled structures in my left breast. 
The lights are still dimmed, but the doctor is gone, the examination  
now concluded. Shedding quickly the baggy hospital gown, open 
at the front and so large it can wrap almost twice around my body. 
What should I do with it? I ask the nurse. Just leave it here, she 
says. She takes the syringe still half-filled with the yellowish fluid. 
Will you have to send it for further testing? I ask her. No, it is not 
necessary in  case of a cyst, she says and places the syringe in a 
yellow plastic container for the medical waste. 
The draining of the fluid from my breast is technically called fine needle 
aspiration. As I read in a paper published in American Journal of 
Radiology: 
Aspiration may be performed [in the case of simple cysts] if the 
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patient is symptomatic or if the cyst prevents adequate 
compression for mammography. Aspirated fluid is typically not 
sent for cytology if  it is cloudy yellow or green because of high 
false-positive rates. The fluid is sent for cytologic evaluation if it is 
bloody or if the patient requests that the aspirate be tested (Hines, 
Slanetz, & Eisenberg, 2010, W122).  
The discarded syringe and its liquid contents are seemingly incidental, 
even immaterial, for the imaging of the breast lesion, excluded as they are 
from further mattering in the diagnostic practices of the breast clinic, and 
therefore from its vision. There is no use for the drained fluid, no need to 
test it. Furthermore, as suggested by the medical literature and the 
doctor’s question as to whether I want the cyst drained off, there is even 
no need to perform the procedure in the first place. In my case the 
draining of the cyst is not meant to confirm a seemingly already certain 
diagnosis but rather to remove the discomfort and disquiet of a 
symptomatic patient. And yet, the syringe half-filled with a yellowish fluid 
is also highly consequential, as it constitutes a powerful visualization of 
the simple cyst, its liquid form made apparent. Fine needle aspiration can 
be seen in this context as a haptic optic system. As the needle pierces 
the flesh guided by the “listening-touch” of the ultrasound and its 
diffracted vision, as the plunger slides up the syringe its suction draining 
the fluid, the procedure reveals to the eye what the ultrasound has 
already seemingly made visible: a black, sonolucent spot on the 
ultrasound display as the effect of the high-frequency sound wave 
moving through the non-reflective, anechoic fluid of a simple cyst. It is by 
this act of draining, which makes it disappear from the ultrasound display 
(and thus from the clinic’s diagnostic field of vision), that the cyst can 
finally be materialized and seen as just that: a simple water-filled nodule, 
the absence of which can be inspected and felt – just as its earlier 
presence had been – by skilled hands.  
Lying on the bed, a room with strong lights. My arms above my 
head.  The breast-care nurse is touching my breasts. Yes, there is 
something here, she says examining my left breast. It feels like a 
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cyst, perhaps a fibrocystic matter, but it is absolutely benign, it is 
nothing malignant. What would it feel like if it were malignant? I 
ask. What do you mean? she asks me back. How does a 
cancerous lump feel? It is hard and craggy, with little arms and 
legs coming out of it. This feels round and soft, and mobile. This is 
a benign cyst. 
This scene constitutes the very first episode in my encounter with the 
breast clinic and its diagnostic apparatuses. But it is not the first time I 
have undergone a physical examination for my breast complaint. Almost 
three months earlier, soon after I have become aware of the suspicious 
lump, a doctor and a nurse from my local GP practice determine that – 
while some harder areas can indeed be felt in my left breast – to their 
practiced hands they do not seem suspicious at all. Still, deemed expert 
in the knowledge of my body, I am referred to the breast clinic, although 
the referral is considered non-urgent. My self-knowledge is meant to be 
the result of being “breast aware,” that is – to quote a leaflet produced by 
the Breast Cancer Care charity – “getting to know how your breasts look 
and feel so you know what is normal for you” and, therefore, can be 
“more confident about noticing any unusual changes that may be a 
symptom of breast cancer” (2016, p. 11). In the breast cancer early-
detection campaigns, breast awareness had superseded breast self-
examination (BSE): “a regular, repetitive monthly palpation to a rigorous 
set method performed by the woman at the same time each month” 
(Thornton & Pillarisetti, 2008, p. 2119).  
The genealogies of BSE and breast awareness are quite complex. 
While the idea of examining breasts for small lumps had been tentatively 
promoted throughout the first half of the twentieth century, the notion of 
BSE was introduced and gained momentum in the 1950s with the joint 
campaign by the American Cancer Society and National Cancer Institute 
(Lerner, 2001). Inspired by the success of the Pap smear for the early 
detection of cervical cancer, BSE was intended as a similarly life-saving 
screening method for breast cancer at the time when other techniques 
(such as mammography) were not yet fully developed. Controversial from 
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its very inception due to the often sexualized images of the female body 
used in its promotion, and the inducing of the fear of cancer among 
healthy women (Lerner, 2001), since the 1970s BSE has come under 
growing scientific scrutiny because it has been linked to the increased 
numbers of benign lumps identified and biopsies performed but not to the 
reduction in breast cancer mortality and morbidity (Thornton & Pillarisetti, 
2008). Deemed harmful to women and burdensome to health services, 
BSE has since been largely rejected in favor of breast awareness the 
clinical benefits of which are still debated, but which, nevertheless – as 
evidenced by the Breast Cancer Care leaflet – is currently encouraged as 
a cancer-screening tool among so-called “well women” (Thornton & 
Pillarisetti, 2008). 
In contrast to the rigorous palpation of BSE, being breast aware 
means assessing both tactile and visual cues, looking not only for lumps 
and swellings inside the breast but also for any changes in its outward 
appearance. In fact, out of the eight changes that should be looked for, 
according to the Breast Cancer Care leaflet (2016, pp. 13-14), only two 
(“a lump or area that feels thicker than the rest of the breast” and “a 
swelling in your armpit or around your collarbone”) refer to symptoms that 
could be experienced specifically through palpation while the remaining 
six (“a change in size or shape” of the breast; “a change in skin texture 
such as puckering or dimpling”; “redness or a rash on the skin and/or 
around the nipple”; “your nipple has become pulled in or looks different”; 
“liquid that comes from the nipple without squeezing”; and “pain in your 
breast or your armpit that’s there all or almost all the time”) rely on 
various sensory signals, including a more general sensation of pain. 
Despite that, through genealogical links with its discredited predecessor 
BSE, the practice of breast awareness and its role in early cancer 
detection is still considered predominantly in terms of “touching and 
finding” (Thornton & Pillarisetti, 2008, p. 2119), rather than seeing or 
making visible. 
In the breast clinic, the physical examination precedes the 
ultrasound scan and the fine needle aspiration. In some cases (but not in 
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mine), it might be all that is required. As the trained eyes and hands or, to 
use Hayward’s (2010) term, “fingeryeyes,” of the breast-care nurse trace 
the shapes and structures of my flesh, the lump in my left breast slowly 
materializes in a form intelligible to the breast service, and to me. No 
images or even image data are being produced here, but the hard mass 
in my breast is made observable and apparent as a benign rather than 
malignant condition. What is also made apparent (in fact, conspicuous by 
its absence) is breast cancer. I am fascinated by the imaginary of a hard, 
craggy, tentacled entity brought forth by the haptic optics of physical 
examination. And I wonder what careful practices have taught the nurse 
to see and feel and render visible and knowable the craggy body of the 
cancer and the round soft one of the benign cyst. Thinking back to my 
reading of the breast imaging textbook and its descriptions of simple 
cysts, not just as sonolucent spots but as round and sharply defined 
objects, I also wonder how other apparatuses, such as ultrasonography 
or mammography and various images produced as their part might be 





Writing about technoscience and its “visual hermeneutics,” Ihde (2009) 
describes imaging technologies as postmodern equivalents of the camera 
obscura, as they powerfully shape and make possible specific ways of 
visualizing and imagining the world. As he notes, these ways of seeing 
involve a reconfiguration of non-visual phenomena into visual ones by 
exaggerating “a kind of magnification/reduction distortion into 
monosensory dimensions” (p. 467), which obscures but does not 
eliminate the “whole body experience.” In her reading of the camera 
obscura, and other versions of “the technological eye”, Haraway 
suggests that the camera needs to be understood not only as “an 
analogy to the seeing eye in brainy, knowing man, for whom body and 
mind are suspicious strangers,” but also, and perhaps more importantly, 
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in its etymological sense as “a judge’s chamber, in camera, within which 
the facts of the world – indeed, the critters of the world – are assayed by 
the standard of the visually convincing” (2008, p. 251). The feminist and 
post-phenomenological politics of knowledge have often treated imaging 
technologies as suspect. But they have also made apparent that no 
intervention is harmless and no way of knowing without its violence. With 
bodies handled, examined or punctured, exposed to the high frequency 
sound waves or electromagnetic radiation, determined as cancerous or 
non-cancerous, committed to life-changing, grueling treatments or 
excluded from them, what counts in the process of medical imaging is 
not without its material consequences. Writing about the history of breast 
cancer treatments, Barron H. Lerner (2001) notes the extreme violence of 
early surgical techniques, such as Halsted radical mastectomy or 
Wangensteen’s superradical mastectomy, and how screening and early 
detection programs would commit women with even small tumors to 
these life-changing procedures. S. Lochlann Jain’s (2013) anthropological 
accounts of contemporary “cancer culture” in America draw attention not 
only to the tremendous toxicity of many standard chemotherapy 
regimens but also to the widespread nature and severe consequences of 
delayed cancer diagnoses.  
As I have argued in this article, imaging a simple cyst in the space 
of the breast clinic involves many different apparatuses and different 
ways of making bodies visible and knowable. Not all of these 
apparatuses are commonly considered as imaging technologies, and not 
all ways of making bodies visible in the clinic involve the production of 
images or image data. Certainly not all of them rely on optical 
arrangements for their vision. More often than not, the gaze of the clinic is 
also dependent on the “borderline gaze of touch and hearing.” As I have 
indicated, ultrasonography, a ubiquitous diagnostic apparatus and a 
common example of medical imaging technology, involves seeing with 
sound and sonic diffraction patterns which are translated into electronic 
images; but it also relies on the “listening-touch” of its vibrating 
piezoelectric crystals. Fine needle aspiration and medical examination, 
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excluded as they are from the imaginary of imaging, are differently 
configured haptic optic systems where the suction of the syringe draws 
out and renders visible an anechoic fluid and the skilled “fingeryeyes” of 
doctors and nurses materialize both benign and cancerous lesions. 
Recognizing this synesthetic character of the clinical gaze and its 
apparatuses does not suggest that clinical diagnostic practices are 
simply multisensory, or that different perceptual systems are 
indistinguishable within a body’s sensorium. Rather it draws our attention 
to the non-given nature of distinctions between vision, touch and hearing 
as modes of sensing and knowing, and the equally non-given nature of 
imaging and its technologies. In doing so, it argues for a particular 
conception of knowledge politics beyond “sense atomism” which is 
grounded in non-representationalist, non-individualist understandings of 
sense and experience, and in feminist traditions of situated knowledges 
and response-ability. In this conception, seeing, touching and listening 
are understood not as predefined perceptual and epistemological 
modalities distinct from one another and from the phenomena that they 
render knowable, but – to paraphrase Castañeda (2001, p. 230) – as 
relational qualities that arise out of embodied intra-actions. What counts 
as vision as compared to touch and hearing, and what counts as image 
and imaging are not given in advance but articulated and materialized in 
specific practices and apparatuses which constitute particular instances 
of seeing/touching/hearing/knowing. In this context, responsible (and 
response-able) knowledge-making in biomedicine is not a matter of good 
scientific or clinical practice (if this is to be understood simply in terms of 
following some pre-existing norms or protocols), rather it is a matter of 
accounting for and remaining open to what diagnostic determinations are 
made, what ways of sensing and knowing are involved in making them 
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1 Barad proposes the notion of “intra-action” to characterize the mutual 
constitution of objects, and objects and subjects within phenomena 
(2007, p. 33). Unlike “interaction,” which assumes the existence of 
separate individual agencies prior to their relation, “intra-action” sees 
specific entities not as given but as emerging through their relations in the 
process of differential becoming. 
 
2 Barad’s conceptualization owes much to Haraway’s notion of an 
apparatus of bodily production as a material-semiotic, meaning-
generating matrix which allows for the mapping and materialization of 
boundaries (1988), and to Bohr’s understanding of measurement 
apparatuses as “macroscopic material arrangements through which 
particular concepts are given definition, to the exclusion of others, and 
through which particular phenomena with particular determinate physical 
properties are produced” (Barad, 2007, p. 142). 
 
3 The concepts of “situated knowledges,” “response-ability,” “sense 
atomism” and “synesthesia” are explained and further discussed in the 
following parts of the article. 
  
4 Donna Haraway emphasizes this notion of accountability and 
responsibility in relation to both touch and vision:  
Touch, regard, looking back, becoming with – all these make us 
responsible in unpredictable ways for which worlds take shape. In 
touch and regard, partners willy nilly are in the miscegenous mud 
that infuses our bodies with all that brought that contact into 
being. Touch and regard have consequences. (2008, p. 36) 
 
5 This understanding of representationalism has some important parallels 
with Barad’s conceptualization discussed earlier in this article.  
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6 This understanding of “sense atomism” can be read as another version 
of what Barad refers to as the metaphysics of individualism, an 
ontological framework which sees the world as “composed of individual 
entities with individually determinate boundaries and properties” (2007, p. 
107). 
 
7 The purpose and intention of including these various sources is not to 
tell a story of one patient’s encounters with the breast cancer services 
but rather to make particular theoretical points in relation to imaging and 
its technologies. As such, the events recounted in this section do not 
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